

Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory And Practice David Galula

The third book in the captivating Victorian series. From the time they were in their cradles, Victoria and Albert were destined for each other. However, the passive Albert is well aware that marriage to a quick-tempered, demonstrative young woman like Victoria could result in unnecessary scenes and stormy court feuds. And he is right. The young Queen, as well as having to endure her constant pregnancies, is in perpetual revolt against any encroachment on her position – and Albert is doing just that. Despite attempts on her life and crises like the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, her family – Albert and their nine children – is her prime concern. The Victorian age is truly under way – but the real power behind the throne was the queen's husband.

This collection explores the concepts and practices of masquerade as they apply to concepts and practices of war. The contributors insist that masquerades are everyday aspects of the politics, praxis, and experiences of war, while also discovering that finding masquerades and tracing how they work with war is hardly simple. With a range of theories, innovative methodologies, and contextual binoculars, masquerade emerges as a layered and complex phenomenon. It can appear as state deception, lie, or camouflage, as in the population-centric American warfare in Iraq that was sold as good for the local people, or the hidden violence Russian military forces used on each other and on local men in Chechnya. Masquerade can also be part of a people's war logic as exemplified by the Maoist movement in India. Yet masquerade can also be understood as a normal social mask that people don to foreground an identity or belief from one's cluttered repertoire in order to gain agency. Elements of masquerade can appear in texts that proclaim seemingly unequivocal positions while simultaneously yet subtly suggesting opposing positions. Masquerades of all kinds also seem ubiquitous in fieldwork research and in resistance movements in war zones. Perhaps masquerade, though, is ultimately the denial of death lurking behind the clarion call of security, a call that bolsters war by making militarized policing normal to secure populations from terrorists. These interpretations and others comprise Masquerades of War. This book will be of much interest to students of critical war studies, critical security, conflict studies and IR in general.

Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.

A CIA veteran describes the reasons for what he considers to be the United States' failure as a protective guardian to the world.

Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958

Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare

Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges

Ethics in American, British, and Israeli Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency

RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 4

Over the last decade, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has risen to prominence as the dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the high level of attention paid to the subject by military analysts, the broader theoretical and historical factors which underpin counter-insurgency have received comparatively little critical scrutiny. This volume addresses the gap in existing scholarship by exploring and challenging several critical aspects of the prevailing orthodoxy on COIN. This critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking and practice brings together a number of international academics and practitioners, providing a pluralistic insight on the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations from military, academic, media and civilian administrative perspectives. It also combines US and British insights into the theory and practice of twenty-first century COIN. With the continuing relevance of 'big third party' COIN to Western engagement in future wars of choice, this book provides an important and timely analysis of an issue which will continue to impact American and British security policy and future interventions. This book will appeal to scholars of Military Studies, Strategic Studies, Security Studies and International Relations and to practitioners and policy-makers working in the field of counter-insurgency.

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generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

This groundbreaking investigation uncovers serious mismatches between David Galula's counterinsurgency practice in Algeria and his counterinsurgency theory—the foundation of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan. * Maps * A glossary * A bibliography

The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.

Knife Fights

Theory and Practice

Masquerades of War

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War

A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice

The Insurgents

The British military confronted significant challenges during the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Adhering to the principles and doctrines of previous campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these cities against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing the gap between the ambitions and resources, intent and commitment, that proved so disastrous to the operation. In its detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the effectiveness of insurgent tactics and the danger of ungoverned spaces shielding hostile groups and underscores the need for the British military to acquire new skills for meeting irregular threats in future wars.

The first book of its kind, Hearts and Minds is a scathing response to the grand narrative of U.S. counterinsurgency, in which warfare is defined not by military might alone but by winning the "hearts and minds" of civilians. Dormant as a tactic since the days of the Vietnam War, in 2006 the U.S. Army drafted a new field manual heralding the resurrection of counterinsurgency as a primary military engagement strategy; counterinsurgency campaigns followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that counterinsurgency had utterly failed to account for the actual lived experiences of the people whose hearts and minds America had sought to win. Drawing on leading thinkers in the field and using key examples from Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hearts and Minds brings a long-overdue focus on the many civilians caught up in these conflicts. Both urgent and timely, this important book challenges the idea of a neat divide between insurgents and the populations from which they emerge—and should be required reading for anyone engaged in the most important contemporary debates over U.S. military policy.

Presents numerous case studies of guerrilla insurgencies and the different options for official government responses

A template for the defeat of insurgents seeks to define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, discuss its principles, and outline the corresponding strategy and tactics.

Money in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

The Queen's Husband

David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War

The British Experience of Irregular Warfare

The Counterinsurgency Era

Counterinsurgency in Crisis

An influential Army officer traces the Gulf War experiences that shaped his perspectives on the changing nature of conventional combat and his then-discounted views about terrorism, citing his role in coauthoring the military's new counterinsurgency field manual. 30,000 first printing.

A collection of original works covering all aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency through a multinational lens, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War addresses the need to look beyond the United States and other prominent counterinsurgency actors in the contemporary world. It also reassesses some of the latent and burgeoning insurgent organizations and networks around the globe and suggests alternative approaches to understanding insurgency, counterinsurgency, and conventional and asymmetric warfare as they relate to insurgency and counterinsurgency. This book makes significant contributions to international and interdisciplinary discussions regarding the seminal features of insurgency and counterinsurgency in modern warfare. It also relates topics with terrorism in the post-9/11 era, including the historical roots of insurgency, radicalism in Europe, and regional radical groups like al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba. It emphasizes how issues around insurgency, counterinsurgency, and terrorism permeate or evolve into particular forms of warfare, military operations, and related governmental activities. Using a diversified lens of analysis, the chapters illustrate key elements that spawn insurgency such as insurgents' beliefs, motivations, aims, leadership characteristics, recruitment methods, operations planning, and responses to state and non-state efforts to contain insurgency. The book also examines how certain terrorist and insurgent operations can remain in the shadows and become secret wars beneath the growing surface threats they pose to the societies in which they breed activity. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War takes a unique look at a subject that has become widely studied and written about in reaction to

modern terrorism and insurgency. It analyzes conditions under which insurgency and counterinsurgency occur from nuanced perspectives that have not previously received full consideration. A distinguished political theorist sounds the alarm about the counterinsurgency strategies used to govern Americans Militarized police officers with tanks and drones. Pervasive government surveillance and profiling. Social media that distract and track us. All of these, contends Bernard E. Harcourt, are facets of a new and radical governing paradigm in the United States--one rooted in the modes of warfare originally developed to suppress anticolonial revolutions and, more recently, to prosecute the war on terror. The Counterrevolution is a penetrating and disturbing account of the rise of counterinsurgency, first as a military strategy but increasingly as a way of ruling ordinary Americans. Harcourt shows how counterinsurgency's principles--bulk intelligence collection, ruthless targeting of minorities, pacifying propaganda--have taken hold domestically despite the absence of any radical uprising. This counterrevolution against phantom enemies, he argues, is the tyranny of our age. Seeing it clearly is the first step to resisting it effectively.

Examines the differences in the abilities of the British Army in Malaya and the United States Army in Vietnam to adapt their strategies when confronted with unexpected guerilla warfare.

Warfare in the Twentieth Century

Spec Ops

Counterinsurgency warfare. Theory and practice. Forew. by R.R. Bowie

David Galula

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Hearts and Minds

Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.

During combat, soldiers make life-and-death choices dozens of times a day. These individual decisions accumulate to determine the outcome of wars. This work examines the theory and practice of military ethics in counterinsurgency operations. Marcus Schulzke surveys the ethical traditions that militaries borrow from; compares ethics in practice in the US Army, British Army and Royal Marines Commandos, and Israel Defense Forces; and draws conclusions that may help militaries refine their approaches in future conflicts. The work is based on interviews with veterans and military personnel responsible for ethics training, review of training materials and other official publications, published accounts from combat veterans, and observation of US Army focus groups with active-duty soldiers. Schulzke makes a convincing argument that though military ethics cannot guarantee flawless conduct, incremental improvements can be made to reduce war's destructiveness while improving the success of counterinsurgency operations.

This comprehensive analytical biography is the definitive work on the life and writings of history's most significant counterinsurgency doctrinaire, David Galula, elucidating the context for his reflections and examining the present and future applicability of his treatise for scholars and practitioners alike.

David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots-including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.

Warrior-scholarship in counter-insurgency

Counter-insurgency Warfare

Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency Practice Versus Theory

The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.

Seasoned soldier and scholar of military science, Jehan Morel introduces us to the world of guerilla and counter-guerilla warfare in a captivating book that is part practical handbook and part historical examination of the major contemporary geopolitical movements. Relying on his first-hand counter-insurgency experience in Indochina and Central Africa and on his encyclopedic knowledge of asymmetric warfare, this thoroughly researched work gives us an inner glimpse of their actual nature. A world where the strong fervor and boldness of rebels need to be supported by clarity of purpose, strategic planning and perfect execution to achieve their goals: proclaiming the independence of a country under occupation, overthrowing the country's regime or beating a

foreign invading army through a war of attrition. Counter-guerilla warfare is also subjected to the same methodical examination that provides the ideal structural foundation of its organization and the recommended astute to eradicate an insurgency. Its reading gives to the reader the details of the ideal organizations of guerilla and counter-guerilla alike; the infrastructure and resources needed to support their actions; as well as the minutiae of their typical operations (attack of an outpost, headquarters, a military parade, a patrol; a prison raid, a road or river convoy ambush, jungle combat, urban guerrilla, street fighting ...). It takes us to the "hidden" theaters of war that play major roles in a guerrilla: funding, intelligence, deception, psychological, penetration of the enemy, cyber warfare, communications, all of them key components that affect the issue of the conflict, yet are usually overlooked in favor of the more "news-friendly" martial aspect of war. It takes us to the discovery of the true decisive factor of the success of guerilla or counter-guerilla operations: winning the heart and minds of the local population, whose support is essential and which bestows legitimacy to the "cause." Securing that support requires outlining clear rules of engagements, having a drastic code of justice and ensuring harmonious relationships between the guerilla (or counter-guerilla) operatives and the local population. Then, taking a step back from the day-to-day cycle of actions and retaliations, the author provides an in-depth analysis of the major geopolitical and geostrategic upheavals of our era, from the war of Indochina and the bloody "events" of Algeria, according to the official language-to today's ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria, from the Colombian FARC and ELN, the Indian Naxalites to the Ugandan LRA. Providing contextual analysis and historical background to each of these, he points out the failures of his own indecisive country in the regions where he was operating, brings a magnifying glass to the myriad of conflicts of local or global importance, retraces their roots (ethnic rivalries, political enmities, religious fundamentalism, money) and elucidates their stakes. Jehan Morel give us a fascinating book that is realistic about the present and pessimistic about the future.

A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.

This groundbreaking investigation uncovers serious mismatches between David Galula's counterinsurgency practice in Algeria and his counterinsurgency theory—the foundation of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan. • Maps • A glossary • A bibliography

A Global History

How Our Government Went to War Against Its Own Citizens

His Life and Intellectual Context - Scholar's Choice Edition

Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla

Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

The Counterrevolution

The twentieth century was dominated by war and by preparations for war in a way that is unparalleled in history. Originally published in 1988, this textbook highlights key themes of warfare throughout the world and emphasizes the gulf between the theory of war and its practice. The contributors are professional historians and strategists who consider the impact of war upon society, theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency and nuclear strategy, as well as more 'traditional topics' such as tactics and strategy on land, the role of sea power, the evolution of strategic bombing, colonial and revolutionary warfare. Each chapter discusses recent research on the topic and provides guides to further reading. Together they give a clear up-to-date overview of the conflicts which dominated the twentieth century. This textbook is useful reading for all students and teachers of strategic and war studies, military history and international relations and for all those concerned with the study of major conflicts in the twentieth century.

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military's fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. This book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past 60 years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish Troubles (1969-79), and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. It will be of interest to students of counter-insurgency, military history, strategic studies, security studies, and IR in general.

A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize The inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars who—against fierce resistance from within their own ranks—changed the way the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars. The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post-Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice. Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point's Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies' techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army. Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made

it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.

This textbook offers an accessible introduction to counterinsurgency operations, a key aspect of modern warfare.

A People's History of Counterinsurgency

Counter-Insurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice, Etc. [With Maps.].

War of the Flea

National Styles and Strategic Cultures

Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory

Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard ’ s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America ’ s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.

Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice Greenwood Publishing Group

This research collection provides a comprehensive study of important strategic, cultural, ethical and philosophical aspects of modern warfare. It offers a refreshing analysis of key issues in modern warfare, not only in terms of the conduct of war and the wider complexities and ramifications of modern conflict, but also concepts of war, the crucial shifts in the structure of warfare, and the morality and legality of the use of force in a post-9/11 age.

When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Modern Warfare

Galula in Algeria

(Queen Victoria: Book 3)

Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice

"This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counter-insurgency warfare. Minimising the use of force and winning over the population's opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations"--

This book offers an analysis of key individuals who have contributed to both the theory and the practice of counterinsurgency (COIN). Insurgencies have become the dominant form of armed conflict around the world today. The perceptible degeneration of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan into insurgent quagmires has sparked a renewal of academic and military interest in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. In light of this, this book provides a rigorous analysis of those individuals who have contributed to both the theory and practice of counterinsurgency: ‘warrior-

scholars'. These are soldiers who have bridged the academic-military divide by influencing doctrinal and intellectual debates about irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is notoriously difficult for the military, and scholarly understanding about this type of warfare is also problematic; especially given the residual anti-intellectualism within Western militaries. Thus, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare is dedicated to analysing the best perceivable bridge between these two worlds. The authors explore the theoretical and practical contributions made by a selection of warrior-scholars of different nationalities, from periods ranging from the French colonial wars of the mid-twentieth century to the Israeli experiences in the Middle East; from contributions to American counter-insurgency made during the Iraq War, to the thinkers who shaped the US war in Vietnam. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, strategic studies, defence studies, war studies and security studies in general.

This timely book offers a world history of insurgencies and of counterinsurgency warfare. Jeremy Black moves beyond the conventional Western-centric narrative, reaching back to antiquity to trace the pre-modern origins of war within states. His sweeping study will be essential reading for all students of military history.

Counterinsurgency Warfare and Brutalisation, the Second Russian-Chechen War

A French View of Counterinsurgency

Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare

On Guerrilla Warfare

The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare

Counterinsurgency Warfare