

Overconfidence And War The Havoc And Glory Of Positive Illusions

OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR Harvard University Press

Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force.

Presents a controversial history of violence which argues that today's world is the most peaceful time in human existence, drawing on psychological insights into intrinsic values that are causing people to condemn violence as an acceptable measure.

Covering all aspects of war in the modern era The Oxford Handbook of War will be the definitive study in this area for years to come.

Violence after War

War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens

Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War

The new science of self-belief

The Case of Turkey's Syria Policy

Blunders, Blunders, and Wars

Why Violence Has Declined

The Invisible Gorilla

This edited volume addresses the issue of threat inflation in American foreign policy and domestic politics. The Bush administration's aggressive campaign to build public support for an invasion of Iraq reheated fears about the president's ability to manipulate the public, and many charged the administration with 'threat inflation', duping the news media and misleading the public into supporting the war under false pretences. Presenting the latest research, these essays seek to answer the question of why threat inflation occurs and when it will be successful. Simply defined, it is the effort by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that disinterested analysis would justify. More broadly, the process concerns how elites view threats, the political uses of threat inflation, the politics of threat framing among competing elites, and how the public interprets and perceives threats via the news media. The war with Iraq gets special attention in this volume, along with the 'War on Terror'. Although many believe that the Bush administration successfully inflated the Iraq threat, there is not a neat consensus about why this was successful. Through both theoretical contributions and case studies, this book showcases the four major explanations of threat inflation -- realism, domestic politics, psychology, and constructivism -- and makes them confront one another directly. The result is a richer appreciation of this important dynamic in US politics and foreign policy, present and future. This book will be of much interests to students of US foreign and national security policy, international security, strategic studies and IR in general. Trevor Thrall is Assistant Professor of Political Science and directs the Master of Public Policy program at the University of Michigan - Dearborn. Jane Kellett Cramer is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oregon.

As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In *Waging War, Planning Peace*, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology—specifically, construal level theory—can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future. In addition to preparations for "Phase IV" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps.

A quirky look at India using popular economics Why does the stock exchange dip during a lunar eclipse? Why don't cars with safety features lead to fewer injuries? Why did Nehru ignore the Chinese threat in the lead-up to the 1962 war? Why is it that a stranger might risk his life to save yours on one day, and a street full of passers-by might casually watch you bleed to death on another? Why did pollsters wrongly predict a BJP victory in 2004, and what was the real reason for their defeat? And why is India's Independence Day not, in fact, on the day on which it's celebrated? In pithy, sparkling, bite-sized chapters, economists Vivek Dehejia and Rupa Subramanya tackle these seeming mysteries and unearth the real reasons why 'we are like this only'. The answers are entertaining and surprising at every turn, and reveal a picture of modern India as never seen before.

Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in "Overconfidence and War," states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war. Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war

(World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions. The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.

Gambling on War

Principles and Cases

Who Wins?

Biopolicy

Waging War, Planning Peace

U.S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars

Between Revenge and Recovery

Threat Inflation Since 9/11

Discusses the irrational, risk-taking decisions of overconfident leaders which led to a seminal turning point in world history that shaped the twentieth century.

Analyses how the democracy of the classical Athenians revolutionized military practices and underwrote their unprecedented commitment to war-making.

On April 4, 1864, Abraham Lincoln made a shocking admission about his presidency during the Civil War. "I claim not to have controlled events," he wrote in a letter, "but confess plainly that events have controlled me." Lincoln's words carry an invaluable lesson for wartime presidents, writes Andrew J. Polsky in this seminal book. As Polsky shows, when commanders-in-chief do try to control wartime events, more often than not they fail utterly. In Elusive Victories, Polsky provides a fascinating study of six wartime presidents, drawing larger lessons about the limits of the power of the White House during armed conflict. He examines, in turn, Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, showing how each gravely overestimated his power as commander-in-chief. In each case, these presidents' resources did not match the key challenges that recur from war to war. Both Lincoln and Johnson intervened in military operations, giving orders to specific units; yet both struggled with the rising unpopularity of their conflicts. Both Wilson and Bush entered hostilities with idealistic agendas for the aftermath, yet found themselves helpless to enact them. With insight and clarity, Polsky identifies overarching issues that will inform current and future policymakers. The single most important dynamic, he writes, is the erosion of a president's freedom of action. Each decision propels him down a path from which he cannot turn back. When George W. Bush rejected the idea of invading Iraq with 400,000 troops, he could not send such a force two years later as the insurgency spread. In the final chapter, Polsky examines Barack Obama's options in light of these conclusions, and considers how the experiences of the past might inform the world we face now. Elusive Victories is the first book to provide a comprehensive account of presidential leadership during wartime, highlighting the key dangers that presidents have ignored at their peril.

This book sets out to explain the variation in nations' reactions to their defeats in war. Typically, we observe two broad reactions to defeat: an inward-oriented response that accepts defeat as a reality and utilizes it as an opportunity for a new beginning, and an outward-oriented one that rejects defeat and invests national energies in restoring what was lost--most likely by force. This volume argues that although defeats in wars are humiliating experiences, those sentiments do not necessarily trigger aggressive nationalism, empower radical parties, and create revisionist foreign policy. Post-defeat, radicalization will be actualized only if it is filtered through three variables: national self-images (inflated or realistic), political parties (strong or weak), and international opportunities and constraints. The author tests this theory on four detailed case studies, Egypt (1967), Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Hungary and Bulgaria (WWI), and Islamic fundamentalism.

Gardens of the Anthropocene

Introduction to International Relations

The Aftermath of Defeats in War

Events - Future, Trends, Perspectives

How Wars End

The True Cost of the Military

Perfectly Confident

Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts

This book proposes and defends the practice of urban gardening as an ecologically and socially beneficial, culturally innovative, morally appropriate, ethically uplifting, and politically incisive way for individuals and variously networked collectives to contribute to a successful management of some defining challenges of the Anthropocene – this new epoch in which no earthly place, form, entity, process, or system escapes the reach of human activity – including urban resilience and climate change.

British Generals in Blair's Wars is based on a series of high profile seminars held in Oxford in which senior British officers, predominantly from the army, reflect on their experience of campaigning. The chapters embrace all the UK's major operations since the end of the Cold War, but they focus particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. As personal testimonies, they capture the immediacy of the authors' thoughts at the time, and show how the ideas of a generation of senior British officers developed in a period of rapid change, against a background of intense political controversy and some popular unease. The armed forces were struggling to revise their Cold War concepts and doctrines, and to find the best ways to meet the demands placed upon them by their political leaders in what was seen to be a 'New World Order'. It was a time when relations between the Government of the day and the armed services came under close scrutiny, and when the affection of the British public for its forces seemed to grow with the difficulty of their operational tasks. This is a truly unique and invaluable book. For the first time, we are offered first-hand testimony about Britain's involvement in recent campaigns by senior participants. In addition to touching on themes like civilian-military relations, the operational direction of war and relationships with allies, these eyewitness accounts give a real sense of how the character of a war changes even as it is being fought. It will be essential reading for those in military academies and staff colleges, not only in Britain but throughout NATO, and especially in the USA. It also has profound policy implications, as both the UK and NATO more generally reassess their strategies and the value of intervention operations. It will also become a primary source for historians and students of the wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

Maxwell's Demon and the Golden Apple will appeal to leaders of multinational corporations and government programs as well as instructors of undergraduate courses in international relations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was left as the world's sole superpower, which was the dawn of an international order known as unipolarity. The ramifications of imbalanced power extend around the globe—including the country at the center. What has the sudden realization that it stands alone atop the international hierarchy done to the United States? In *Psychology of a Superpower*, Christopher J. Fettweis examines how unipolarity affects the way U.S. leaders conceive of their role, make strategy, and perceive America's place in the world. Combining security, strategy, and psychology, Fettweis investigates how the idea of being number one affects the decision making of America's foreign-policy elite. He examines the role the United States plays in providing global common goods, such as peace and security; the effect of the Cold War's end on nuclear-weapon strategy and policy; the psychological consequences of unbalanced power; and the grand strategies that have emerged in unipolarity. Drawing on psychology's insights into the psychological and behavioral consequences of unchecked power, Fettweis brings new insight to political science's policy-analysis toolkit. He also considers the prospect of the end of unipolarity, offering a challenge to widely held perceptions of American indispensability and asking whether the unipolar moment is worth trying to save. *Psychology of a Superpower* is a provocative rethinking of the risks and opportunities of the global position of the United States, with significant consequences for U.S. strategy, character, and identity.

Making Sense of Modern India

The Oxford Handbook of War

An International Approach

Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler

The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in International Politics

A Critique

British Generals in Blair's Wars

Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States

No historical event has exerted more influence on America's post-World War II use of military force than the Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The supposed grand lesson of Munich—namely, that capitulating to the demands of aggressive dictatorships invites further aggression and makes inevitable a larger war—has been a guiding principle for Harry Truman through George W. Bush. In *The Specter of Munich*, noted defense analyst Jeffrey Record takes an unconventional look at a disastrous chapter in Western diplomatic history. After identifying the common lessons of the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler and the reasons for the policy's failure, Record disputes the stock thesis that unchecked aggression always invites further aggression. He identifies other lessons of the 1930s more relevant to meeting today's U.S. foreign policy and security challenges. Among those lessons are the severe penalties that can incur, the constraints of public opinion in a modern democracy, and the virtue of consistency in threatening and using force. *The Specter of Munich* concludes that because the political, military, and economic environment differs considerably from that of the 1930s, the United States is making some of the same strategic mistakes in its war on terror that the British and French made in their attempts to protect themselves against Nazi Germany. Not the least of these mistakes is the continued reliance on the specter of Adolf Hitler.

security threats.

The second edition of this bestselling introductory textbook provides a truly comprehensive and accessible guide to international affairs. Bringing together the combined researching and teaching global politics of three acclaimed scholars, this text introduces students to what is happening in our complex and rapidly changing world and those events. Pedagogically driven, the book is structured around enduring questions that reflect the key concepts in world politics. It makes use of the levels of analysis features to highlight connections between theory and practice, aspirations and reality and history and contemporary events. This fully updated second edition includes International Organizations, a new feature to give students an insight into the latest academic research, and has been extensively rewritten throughout. This is an ideal modules for political science and international relations undergraduate students. This new edition offers: - A brand new chapter on International Law and Organizations Insights feature in every chapter encouraging closer connections with the latest academic research - New author video debates on thought-provoking questions - Extra include the latest advances in thinking and contemporary case examples - A historically-driven, empirical narrative to answer broad enduring questions - A rigorous and pluralistic theoretical approaches - A comprehensive companion website, including videos, author debates, simulation activities, quizzes and teaching tools.

An expert on the psychology of decision making at Berkeley's Haas School of Business helps readers calibrate their confidence, arguing that some confidence is good, but can hinder growth. A surge of confidence can feel fantastic—offering a rush of energy, even a dazzling vision of the future. It can give us courage and bolster our determination. But if that self-assurance leads us to pursue impossible goals, it can waste time, money, and energy. Self-help books and motivational speakers tell us that the more confidence. But this way of thinking can lead to enormous trouble. Decades of research demonstrates that we often have an over-inflated sense of self and are rarely as good as we think we are. This is the first book to bring together the best psychological and economic studies to explain exactly what confidence is, when it can be helpful, and when it can be destructive. Confidence is an attitude that takes into account both personal feelings and the facts. Don Moore identifies the ways confidence behaves in real life and raises thought-provoking questions: How should you be about an uncertain future? What justifies your confidence in something amorphous and subjective like your attractiveness or sense of humor? Moore reveals that success is to avoid being both over- and under-confident. In this essential guide, he shows how to become perfectly confident—how to strive for and maintain the well-calibrated confidence that can elevate all areas of our lives.

This book offers a systematic critique of recent interventionist just war theories, which have made the recourse to force easier to justify. The work argues that these traditionalist prerogatives to national leaders and a cosmopolitan human rights paradigm, offer criteria for war which are insufficient in principle and dangerous in practice. In the plurality of moral considerations, the book recommends a modified legalist national defense paradigm, which includes an atrocity threshold for humanitarian intervention authorization requirement. The plausibility of this restrictive framework is applied to case studies, including the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing targeted killing interventions in Syria and elsewhere. Various arguments which seek to loosen the criteria for war are also systematically analysed and criticized. This book will be of major interest to students of just war theory, military history, ethics, political philosophy, and International Relations.

A Scientific and Conceptual Investigation

Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy

Ethics, Security, and the War Machine

Perspectives, Connections, and Enduring Questions

The Better Angels of Our Nature

Ethics and Politics of the Built Environment
And Other Ways Our Intuitions Deceive Us

The willingness to believe in some kind of payback or karma remains nearly universal. Retribution awaits those who commit bad deeds; rewards await those who do good. Johnson explores how this belief has developed over time, and how it has shaped the course of human evolution.

What shapes political behavior more: the situations in which individuals find themselves, or the internal psychological makeup—beliefs, values, and so on—of those individuals? This is perhaps the leading division within the psychological study of politics today. Political Psychology: Situations, Individuals, and Cases, 2nd edition, provides a concise, readable, and conceptually organized introduction to the topic of political psychology by examining this very question. Using this situationism--dispositionism framework—which roughly parallels the concerns of social and cognitive psychology—this book focuses on such key explanatory mechanisms as behaviorism, obedience, personality, groupthink, cognition, affect, emotion, and neuroscience to explore topics ranging from voting behavior and racism to terrorism and international relations. The new edition includes a new chapter on the psychology of the media and communication. Houghton has also updated the text to analyze recent political events such as the 2012 election, and to include up-and-coming research in the areas of neuroscience, behavioral economics, and more. Houghton's clear and engaging examples directly challenge students to place themselves in both real and hypothetical situations which involve intense moral and political dilemmas. This highly readable text will provide students with the conceptual foundation they need to make sense of the rapidly changing and increasingly

important field of political psychology.

This book introduces a new perspective on risk seeking behaviour, developing a framework based on various cognitive theories, and applying it to the specific case-study of Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria. The author examines why policy makers commit themselves to policies that they do not have the capacity to deliver, and develops an alternative theoretical model to prospect theory in explaining risk taking behaviour based on the concept of overconfidence. The volume suggests that overconfident individuals exhibit risk seeking behaviour that contradicts the risk averse behaviour of individuals in the domain of gain, as predicted by prospect theory. Using a set of testable hypothesis deduced from the model, it presents an empirical investigation of the causes behind Turkish decision makers' unprecedented level of risk taking toward the uprising in Syria and the consequences of this policy.

The relationship between religion, intolerance and conflict has been the subject of intense discussion, particularly in the wake of the events of 9-11 and the ongoing threat of terrorism. This book contains original papers written by some of the world's leading scholars in anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and theology exploring the scientific and conceptual dimensions of religion and human conflict. Authors investigate the following themes: the role of religion in promoting social cohesion and the conditions under which it will tend to do so; the role of religion in enabling and exacerbating conflict between different social groups and the conditions under which it will tend to do so; and the policy responses that we may be able to develop to ameliorate violent conflict and the limits to compromise between different religions. The book also contains two commentaries that distill, synthesize and critically evaluate key aspects of the individual chapters and central themes that run throughout the volume. The volume will be of great interest to all readers interested in the phenomenon of religious conflict and to academics across a variety of disciplines, including religious studies, philosophy, psychology, theology, cognitive science, anthropology, politics, international relations, and evolutionary biology.

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Strategic Instincts

Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict

How Confidence Works

Political Psychology

How the Fear of God Makes Us Human

American Foreign Policy and The Politics of Fear

What America and China Can Learn

Behavioural Economics and Terrorism can be used as a guide to help us think about thinking and, in doing so, to appreciate the deep quirkiness of human behaviour. Each day, people draw on their understanding of human behaviour. This takes place subconsciously for the most part but as situations become more complex it becomes necessary to think more deliberately about how people make their decisions. This book can be used to better understand human action in such contexts. In the high-stakes world of counter-terrorism, every angle of advantage is critical. From terrorists' operational choices to the way that information flows through intelligence agencies, the book explains the patterns of behaviour that systematically shape human decision-making, for good and for bad. Decision-makers' use of reference points, their loss aversion, overconfidence, goals and aspirations all shape their choices under conditions of risk and uncertainty. This book helps to shed light on how to use these concepts (and more) to develop deeper insights into the way in which terrorists think about their attack methods and targets.

"A very timely book."—Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO of New America How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In *Strategic Instincts*, Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. *Strategic Instincts* shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.

Most wars between countries end quickly and at relatively low cost. The few in which high-intensity fighting continues for years bring about a disproportionate amount of death and suffering. What separates these few unusually long and intense wars from the many conflicts that are far less destructive? In *Logics of War*, Alex Weisiger tests three explanations for a nation's decision to go to war and continue fighting regardless of the costs. He combines sharp statistical analysis of interstate wars over the past two centuries with nine narrative case studies. He examines both well-

known conflicts like World War II and the Persian Gulf War, as well as unfamiliar ones such as the 1864-1870 Paraguayan War (or the War of the Triple Alliance), which proportionally caused more deaths than any other war in modern history. When leaders go to war expecting easy victory, events usually correct their misperceptions quickly and with fairly low casualties, thereby setting the stage for a negotiated agreement. A second explanation involves motives born of domestic politics; as war becomes more intense, however, leaders are increasingly constrained in their ability to continue the fighting. Particularly destructive wars instead arise from mistrust of an opponent's intentions. Countries that launch preventive wars to forestall expected decline tend to have particularly ambitious war aims that they hold to even when fighting goes poorly. Moreover, in some cases, their opponents interpret the preventive attack as evidence of a dispositional commitment to aggression, resulting in the rejection of any form of negotiation and a demand for unconditional surrender. Weisiger's treatment of a topic of central concern to scholars of major wars will also be read with great interest by military historians, political psychologists, and sociologists.

"What are key mental errors that can undermine good decision making? Drawing on four decades of psychological, historical, and political science research on cognitive biases, this book illuminates key pitfalls in how we and our leaders make decisions. It shows in five case studies of American foreign and energy policy that such errors--a dozen different cognitive biases--have been more important in shaping and impacting U.S. national interests than we currently understand. In so doing, it also sheds light on U.S. foreign policy toward and interests in the Middle East. That story prominently features non-psychological explanations, but cognitive biases exercised by American and foreign actors also represent a slice of the story that is worth revealing. As examples, the book shows how the distorted cognitive lens of Al-Qaeda leaders contributed to the September 11 attacks and the ongoing conflict with America and the West; how overconfidence impacted America's decision to invade Iraq in 2003; and how short-term thinking--a prominent cognitive bias--hurts America's ability to develop a comprehensive energy policy, making the Middle East more important to the United States and enhancing its proclivity to be involved in the region. The book is aimed chiefly at students and the lay public, though academics may benefit from it"--

OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR

Behavioural Economics and Terrorism
Maxwell's Demon and the Golden Apple
Moral Constraints on War
The Specter of Munich
Situations, Individuals, and Cases
The Life Sciences and Public Policy
Integrations

This volume explores the linkage of the life sciences with policy (biopolicy). It features two points of departure: the implications of the neurosciences for public policy; and the implications of evolutionary theory for policy-making. It includes several case studies of how these points of departure inform our knowledge of policy.

Bringing together leading contributors in the field, this new volume analyzes how victory and defeat in modern war can be understood and explained. It does so by confronting two inter-related research problems: the nature of victory and defeat in modern war and the explanations of victory and defeat. By first questioning the extent to which the concepts of victory and defeat are meaningful to describe the outcomes of modern wars, and whether the contents of these concepts are changing, it then evaluates different theories purporting to explain the outcomes of war and the impact of variables, ranging from technology to culture. The book tackles several key questions: What is the definition of victory in the 'War on Terror'? What is the meaning of victory and defeat in contemporary insurgencies, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan? Are the counterstrategies that were developed in the mid-twentieth century valid in order to deal with present and future conflicts? With case studies ranging from the Malayan Emergency to the current conflict in Iraq, Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War will be of great interest to students of war and conflict studies, security studies, military history and international relations.

'Brilliant ... it will change how you think about confidence.' Johann Hari 'Important for everyone but crucial for women.' Mary Robinson 'Interesting and important.' Steven Pinker _____ Why do boys instinctively bullshit more than girls? How do economic recessions shape a generation's confidence? Can we have too much confidence and, if so, what are the consequences? Imagine we could discover something that could make us richer, healthier, longer-living, smarter, kinder, happier, more motivated and more innovative. Ridiculous, you might say... What is this elixir? Confidence. If you have it, it can empower you to reach heights you never thought possible. But if you don't, it can have a devastating effect on your future. Confidence lies at the core of what makes things happen. Exploring the science and neuroscience behind confidence that has emerged over the last decade, clinical psychologist and neuroscientist Professor Ian Robertson tells us how confidence plays out in our minds, our brains and indeed our bodies. He explains where it comes from and how it spreads - with extraordinary economic and political consequences. And why it's not necessarily something you are born with, but something that can be learned.

How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? In Failing to Win, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and

reality.

National Security Through a Cockeyed Lens

Overconfidence and Risk Taking in Foreign Policy Decision Making

Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics

How to Calibrate Your Decisions Wisely

Psychology of a Superpower

Logics of War

Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict

Failing to Win

The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon's invasion of Russia to America's invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. **Blinders, Blunders, and Wars** analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.

Reading this book will make you less sure of yourself—and that's a good thing. In **The Invisible Gorilla**, Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons, creators of one of psychology's most famous experiments, use remarkable stories and counterintuitive scientific findings to demonstrate an important truth: Our minds don't work the way we think they do. We think we see ourselves and the world as they really are, but we're actually missing a whole lot. Chabris and Simons combine the work of other researchers with their own findings on attention, perception, memory, and reasoning to reveal how faulty intuitions often get us into trouble. In the process, they explain: • Why a company would spend billions to launch a product that its own analysts know will fail • How a police officer could run right past a brutal assault without seeing it • Why award-winning movies are full of editing mistakes • What criminals have in common with chess masters • Why measles and other childhood diseases are making a comeback • Why money managers could learn a lot from weather forecasters Again and again, we think we experience and understand the world as it is, but our thoughts are beset by everyday illusions. We write traffic laws and build criminal cases on the assumption that people will notice when something unusual happens right in front of them. We're sure we know where we were on 9/11, falsely believing that vivid memories are seared into our minds with perfect fidelity. And as a society, we spend billions on devices to train our brains because we're continually tempted by the lure of quick fixes and effortless self-improvement. **The Invisible Gorilla** reveals the myriad ways that our intuitions can deceive us, but it's much more than a catalog of human failings. Chabris and Simons explain why we succumb to these everyday illusions and what we can do to inoculate ourselves against their effects. Ultimately, the book provides a kind of x-ray vision into our own minds, making it possible to pierce the veil of illusions that clouds our thoughts and to think clearly for perhaps the first time.

"Dan Reiter explains how information about combat outcomes and other factors may persuade a warring nation to demand more or less in peace negotiations, and why a country might refuse to negotiate limited terms and instead tenaciously pursue absolute victory if it fears that its enemy might renege on a peace deal. He fully lays out the theory and then tests it on more than twenty cases of war-termination behavior, including decisions during the American Civil War, the two world wars, and the Korean War. Reiter helps solve some of the most enduring puzzles in military history, such as why Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, why Germany in 1918 renewed its attack in the West after securing peace with Russia in the East, and why Britain refused to seek peace terms with Germany after France fell in 1940."

Violence after War will be essential reading for all those interested in political violence, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction.

How Cognitive Bias Impacts U.S. Foreign Policy

Elusive Victories

Law Enforcement and Patterns of Behaviour

The American Presidency at War

The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, Volume 2

New Interventionist Just War Theory

Global Discord in the New Millennium

The Psychology of International Politics

Robert Jervis has been a pioneering leader in the study of the psychology of international politics for more than four decades. **How Statesmen Think** presents his most important ideas on the subject from across his career. This collection of revised and updated essays applies, elaborates, and modifies his pathbreaking work. The result is an indispensable book for students and scholars of international relations. **How Statesmen Think** demonstrates that expectations and political and psychological needs are the major drivers of perceptions in international politics, as well as in other arenas. Drawing on the increasing attention psychology is paying to emotions, the book discusses how emotional needs help structure beliefs. It also shows how decision-makers use multiple shortcuts to seek and process information when making foreign policy and national security judgments. For example, the desire to conserve cognitive resources can cause decision-makers to look at misleading indicators of military strength, and psychological pressures can lead them to run particularly high risks. The book also looks at how deterrent threats and counterpart promises often fail because they are misperceived. **How Statesmen Think** examines how these processes play out in many situations that arise in foreign and security policy, including the threat of inadvertent war, the development of domino beliefs, the formation

and role of national identities, and conflicts between intelligence organizations and policymakers.

If pacifists are correct in thinking that war is always unjust, then it follows that we ought to eliminate the possibility and temptation of ever engaging in it; we should not build war-making capacity, and if we already have, then demilitarization—or military abolition—would seem to be the appropriate course to take. On the other hand, if war is sometimes justified, as many believe, then it must be permissible to prepare for it by creating and maintaining a military establishment. Yet this view that the justifiability of war-making is also sufficient to justify war-building is mistaken. This book addresses questions of *jus ante bellum*, or justice before war. Under what circumstances is it justifiable for a polity to prepare for war by militarizing? When (if ever) and why (if at all) is it morally permissible to create and maintain the potential to wage war? In doing so it highlights the ways in which a civilian population compromises its own security in maintaining a permanent military establishment, explores the moral and social costs of militarization, and evaluates whether or not these costs are worth bearing.

A complete exploration of the real-world applications and implications of evolutionary psychology The exciting and sometimes controversial science of evolutionary psychology is becoming increasingly relevant to more fields of study than ever before. The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, Volume 2, Integrations provides students and researchers with new insight into how EP draws from, and is applied in, fields as diverse as economics, anthropology, neuroscience, genetics, and political science, among others. In this thorough revision and expansion of the groundbreaking handbook, luminaries in the field provide an in-depth exploration of the foundations of evolutionary psychology as they relate to public policy, consumer behavior, organizational leadership, and legal issues. Evolutionary psychology seeks to explain the reasons behind friendship, leadership, warfare, morality, religion, and culture — in short, what it means to be human. This enlightening text provides a foundational knowledgebase in EP, along with expert insights and the most up-to-date coverage of recent theories and findings. Explore the vast and expanding applications of evolutionary psychology Discover the psychology of human survival, mating parenting, cooperation and conflict, culture, and more Identify how evolutionary psychology is interwoven with other academic subjects and traditional psychological disciplines Discuss future applications of the conceptual tools of evolutionary psychology As the established standard in the field, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, Volume 2 is the definitive guide for every psychologist and student to understand the latest and most exciting applications of evolutionary psychology.

This third edition of Moral Constraints on War offers a principle by principle presentation of the ethics of war as is found in the age-old tradition of the Just War. Parts one and two trace the evolution of Just War Theory, analyzing the principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*: the principles that determine the conditions under which it is just to start a war and then conduct military operations. Each chapter provides a historical background of the principle under discussion and an in-depth analysis of its meaning. More so than in the previous editions, there is a special focus on the transcultural nature of the principles. Besides theoretical clarifications, each of the principles is also put to the test with numerous historical and contemporary examples. In Part three, Just War Theory is applied in three specific case studies: the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in World War II, the Korean War (1950-53), and the use of armed drones in the "war on terror." Bringing together an international coterie of philosophers and political scientists, this accessible and practical guide offers both students of military ethics and of international relations rich, up-to-date insights into the pluralistic character of Just War Theory.

Confidence, Fear, and the Tragedy of the First World War

How Statesmen Think

God is Watching You